GT AI OS Community Edition v2.0.33
Security hardening release addressing CodeQL and Dependabot alerts: - Fix stack trace exposure in error responses - Add SSRF protection with DNS resolution checking - Implement proper URL hostname validation (replaces substring matching) - Add centralized path sanitization to prevent path traversal - Fix ReDoS vulnerability in email validation regex - Improve HTML sanitization in validation utilities - Fix capability wildcard matching in auth utilities - Update glob dependency to address CVE - Add CodeQL suppression comments for verified false positives 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
HackWeasel
663
apps/control-panel-backend/app/api/tfa.py
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663
apps/control-panel-backend/app/api/tfa.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
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"""
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Two-Factor Authentication API endpoints
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Handles TFA enable, disable, verification, and status operations.
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"""
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import Optional
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status, Request, Cookie
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from fastapi.responses import Response
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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import structlog
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import uuid
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import base64
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import io
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from app.core.database import get_db
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from app.core.auth import get_current_user, JWTHandler
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from app.models.user import User
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from app.models.audit import AuditLog
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from app.models.tfa_rate_limit import TFAVerificationRateLimit
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from app.models.used_temp_token import UsedTempToken
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from app.core.tfa import get_tfa_manager
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logger = structlog.get_logger()
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/tfa", tags=["tfa"])
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# Pydantic models
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class TFAEnableResponse(BaseModel):
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success: bool
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message: str
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qr_code_uri: str
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manual_entry_key: str
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class TFAVerifySetupRequest(BaseModel):
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code: str
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class TFAVerifySetupResponse(BaseModel):
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success: bool
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message: str
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class TFADisableRequest(BaseModel):
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password: str
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class TFADisableResponse(BaseModel):
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success: bool
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message: str
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class TFAVerifyLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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code: str # Only code needed - temp_token from session cookie
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class TFAVerifyLoginResponse(BaseModel):
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success: bool
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access_token: Optional[str] = None
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expires_in: Optional[int] = None
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user: Optional[dict] = None
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message: Optional[str] = None
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class TFAStatusResponse(BaseModel):
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tfa_enabled: bool
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tfa_required: bool
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tfa_status: str
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class TFASessionDataResponse(BaseModel):
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user_email: str
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tfa_configured: bool
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qr_code_uri: Optional[str] = None
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manual_entry_key: Optional[str] = None
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# Endpoints
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@router.get("/session-data", response_model=TFASessionDataResponse)
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async def get_tfa_session_data(
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tfa_session: Optional[str] = Cookie(None),
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""
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Get TFA setup data from server-side session.
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Session ID from HTTP-only cookie.
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Used by /verify-tfa page to fetch QR code on mount.
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"""
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if not tfa_session:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="No TFA session found"
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)
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# Get session from database
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result = await db.execute(
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select(UsedTempToken).where(UsedTempToken.token_id == tfa_session)
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)
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session = result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if not session:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid TFA session"
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)
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# Check expiry
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if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > session.expires_at:
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await db.delete(session)
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await db.commit()
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="TFA session expired"
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)
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# Check if already used
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if session.used_at:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="TFA session already used"
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)
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logger.info(
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"TFA session data retrieved",
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session_id=tfa_session,
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user_id=session.user_id,
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tfa_configured=session.tfa_configured
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)
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return TFASessionDataResponse(
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user_email=session.user_email,
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tfa_configured=session.tfa_configured,
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qr_code_uri=None, # Security: Don't expose QR code data URI - use blob endpoint
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manual_entry_key=session.manual_entry_key
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)
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@router.get("/session-qr-code")
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async def get_tfa_session_qr_code(
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tfa_session: Optional[str] = Cookie(None, alias="tfa_session"),
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""
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Get TFA QR code as PNG blob (secure: never exposes TOTP secret to JavaScript).
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Session ID from HTTP-only cookie.
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Returns raw PNG bytes with image/png content type.
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"""
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if not tfa_session:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="No TFA session found"
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)
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# Get session from database
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result = await db.execute(
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select(UsedTempToken).where(UsedTempToken.token_id == tfa_session)
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)
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session = result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if not session:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid TFA session"
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)
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# Check expiry
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if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > session.expires_at:
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await db.delete(session)
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await db.commit()
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="TFA session expired"
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)
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# Check if already used
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if session.used_at:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="TFA session already used"
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)
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# Check if QR code exists (only for setup flow)
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if not session.qr_code_uri:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
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detail="No QR code available for this session"
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)
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# Extract base64 PNG data from data URI
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# Format: ...
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if not session.qr_code_uri.startswith("data:image/png;base64,"):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
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detail="Invalid QR code format"
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)
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base64_data = session.qr_code_uri.split(",", 1)[1]
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png_bytes = base64.b64decode(base64_data)
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logger.info(
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"TFA QR code blob retrieved",
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session_id=tfa_session,
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user_id=session.user_id,
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size_bytes=len(png_bytes)
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)
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# Return raw PNG bytes
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return Response(
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content=png_bytes,
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media_type="image/png",
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headers={
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"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate",
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"Pragma": "no-cache",
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"Expires": "0"
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}
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)
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#
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@router.post("/enable", response_model=TFAEnableResponse)
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async def enable_tfa(
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request: Request,
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""
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Enable TFA for current user (user-initiated from settings)
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Generates TOTP secret and returns QR code for scanning
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"""
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try:
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# Check if already enabled
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if current_user.tfa_enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="TFA is already enabled for this account"
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)
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# Get tenant name for QR code branding
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tenant_name = None
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if current_user.tenant_id:
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from app.models.tenant import Tenant
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tenant_result = await db.execute(
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select(Tenant).where(Tenant.id == current_user.tenant_id)
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)
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tenant = tenant_result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if tenant:
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tenant_name = tenant.name
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# Validate tenant name exists (fail fast - no fallback)
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if not tenant_name:
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logger.error("Tenant name not configured", user_id=current_user.id, tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
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detail="Tenant configuration error: tenant name not set"
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)
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# Get TFA manager
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tfa_manager = get_tfa_manager()
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# Setup TFA: generate secret, encrypt, create QR code with tenant branding
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encrypted_secret, qr_code_uri, manual_entry_key = tfa_manager.setup_new_tfa(current_user.email, tenant_name)
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# Save encrypted secret to user (but don't enable yet - wait for verification)
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current_user.tfa_secret = encrypted_secret
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await db.commit()
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# Create audit log
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audit_log = AuditLog.create_log(
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action="user.tfa_setup_initiated",
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user_id=current_user.id,
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tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
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details={"email": current_user.email},
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ip_address=request.client.host if request.client else None,
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user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent")
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)
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db.add(audit_log)
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await db.commit()
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logger.info("TFA setup initiated", user_id=current_user.id, email=current_user.email)
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return TFAEnableResponse(
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success=True,
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message="Scan QR code with Google Authenticator and enter the code to complete setup",
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qr_code_uri=qr_code_uri,
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manual_entry_key=manual_entry_key
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)
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except HTTPException:
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raise
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error("TFA enable error", error=str(e), user_id=current_user.id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
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detail="Failed to enable TFA"
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)
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@router.post("/verify-setup", response_model=TFAVerifySetupResponse)
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async def verify_setup(
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verify_data: TFAVerifySetupRequest,
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request: Request,
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""
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Verify initial TFA setup code and enable TFA
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"""
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try:
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# Check if TFA secret exists
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if not current_user.tfa_secret:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="TFA setup not initiated. Call /tfa/enable first."
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)
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# Check if already enabled
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if current_user.tfa_enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="TFA is already enabled"
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)
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# Get TFA manager
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tfa_manager = get_tfa_manager()
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# Decrypt secret
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secret = tfa_manager.decrypt_secret(current_user.tfa_secret)
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# Verify code
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if not tfa_manager.verify_totp(secret, verify_data.code):
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logger.warning("TFA setup verification failed", user_id=current_user.id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="Invalid verification code"
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)
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# Enable TFA
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current_user.tfa_enabled = True
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await db.commit()
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# Create audit log
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audit_log = AuditLog.create_log(
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action="user.tfa_enabled",
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user_id=current_user.id,
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tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
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details={"email": current_user.email},
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ip_address=request.client.host if request.client else None,
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user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent")
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)
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db.add(audit_log)
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await db.commit()
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logger.info("TFA enabled successfully", user_id=current_user.id, email=current_user.email)
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return TFAVerifySetupResponse(
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success=True,
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message="Two-Factor Authentication enabled successfully"
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)
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except HTTPException:
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raise
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error("TFA verify setup error", error=str(e), user_id=current_user.id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
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detail="Failed to verify TFA setup"
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)
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@router.post("/disable", response_model=TFADisableResponse)
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async def disable_tfa(
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disable_data: TFADisableRequest,
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request: Request,
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""
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Disable TFA for current user (requires password confirmation)
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Only allowed if TFA is not required by admin
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"""
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try:
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# Check if TFA is required by admin
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if current_user.tfa_required:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Cannot disable TFA - it is required by your administrator"
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)
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# Check if TFA is enabled
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if not current_user.tfa_enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="TFA is not enabled"
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)
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# Verify password
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from passlib.context import CryptContext
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pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
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if not pwd_context.verify(disable_data.password, current_user.hashed_password):
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logger.warning("TFA disable failed - invalid password", user_id=current_user.id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="Invalid password"
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)
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# Disable TFA and clear secret
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current_user.tfa_enabled = False
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current_user.tfa_secret = None
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await db.commit()
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# Create audit log
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audit_log = AuditLog.create_log(
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action="user.tfa_disabled",
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user_id=current_user.id,
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tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
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details={"email": current_user.email},
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ip_address=request.client.host if request.client else None,
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user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent")
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)
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db.add(audit_log)
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await db.commit()
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logger.info("TFA disabled successfully", user_id=current_user.id, email=current_user.email)
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return TFADisableResponse(
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success=True,
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message="Two-Factor Authentication disabled successfully"
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)
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||||
except HTTPException:
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||||
raise
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error("TFA disable error", error=str(e), user_id=current_user.id)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
|
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detail="Failed to disable TFA"
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||||
)
|
||||
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||||
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@router.post("/verify-login", response_model=TFAVerifyLoginResponse)
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async def verify_login(
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verify_data: TFAVerifyLoginRequest,
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request: Request,
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tfa_session: Optional[str] = Cookie(None),
|
||||
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Verify TFA code during login and issue final JWT
|
||||
Handles both setup (State 2) and verification (State 3)
|
||||
Uses session cookie to get temp_token (server-side session)
|
||||
"""
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try:
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# Get session from cookie
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if not tfa_session:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="No TFA session found"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Get session from database
|
||||
result = await db.execute(
|
||||
select(UsedTempToken).where(UsedTempToken.token_id == tfa_session)
|
||||
)
|
||||
session = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
|
||||
if not session or not session.temp_token:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="Invalid TFA session"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check expiry
|
||||
if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > session.expires_at:
|
||||
await db.delete(session)
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="TFA session expired"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if already used
|
||||
if session.used_at:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="TFA session already used"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Get user_id and token_id from session
|
||||
user_id = session.user_id
|
||||
token_id = session.token_id
|
||||
|
||||
# Check for replay attack
|
||||
if await UsedTempToken.is_token_used(token_id, db):
|
||||
logger.warning("Temp token replay attempt detected", user_id=user_id, token_id=token_id)
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="Token has already been used"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check rate limiting
|
||||
if await TFAVerificationRateLimit.is_rate_limited(user_id, db):
|
||||
logger.warning("TFA verification rate limited", user_id=user_id)
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
|
||||
detail="Too many attempts. Please wait 60 seconds and try again."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Record attempt for rate limiting
|
||||
await TFAVerificationRateLimit.record_attempt(user_id, db)
|
||||
|
||||
# Get user
|
||||
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
|
||||
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
|
||||
if not user or not user.is_active:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail="User not found or inactive"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if TFA secret exists
|
||||
if not user.tfa_secret:
|
||||
logger.error("TFA secret missing during verification", user_id=user_id)
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
detail="TFA not properly configured"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Get TFA manager
|
||||
tfa_manager = get_tfa_manager()
|
||||
|
||||
# Decrypt secret
|
||||
secret = tfa_manager.decrypt_secret(user.tfa_secret)
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify TOTP code
|
||||
if not tfa_manager.verify_totp(secret, verify_data.code):
|
||||
logger.warning("TFA verification failed", user_id=user_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create audit log for failed attempt
|
||||
audit_log = AuditLog.create_log(
|
||||
action="user.tfa_verification_failed",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
|
||||
details={"email": user.email},
|
||||
ip_address=request.client.host if request.client else None,
|
||||
user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent")
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.add(audit_log)
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
detail="Invalid verification code"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# If TFA was enforced but not enabled, enable it now
|
||||
if user.tfa_required and not user.tfa_enabled:
|
||||
user.tfa_enabled = True
|
||||
logger.info("TFA auto-enabled after mandatory setup", user_id=user_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# Mark session as used
|
||||
session.used_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
# Update last login
|
||||
user.last_login_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
# Get tenant context
|
||||
from app.models.tenant import Tenant
|
||||
if user.tenant_id:
|
||||
tenant_result = await db.execute(
|
||||
select(Tenant).where(Tenant.id == user.tenant_id)
|
||||
)
|
||||
tenant = tenant_result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
|
||||
current_tenant_context = {
|
||||
"id": str(user.tenant_id),
|
||||
"domain": tenant.domain if tenant else f"tenant_{user.tenant_id}",
|
||||
"name": tenant.name if tenant else f"Tenant {user.tenant_id}",
|
||||
"role": user.user_type,
|
||||
"display_name": user.full_name,
|
||||
"email": user.email,
|
||||
"is_primary": True
|
||||
}
|
||||
available_tenants = [current_tenant_context]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
current_tenant_context = {
|
||||
"id": None,
|
||||
"domain": "none",
|
||||
"name": "No Tenant",
|
||||
"role": user.user_type
|
||||
}
|
||||
available_tenants = []
|
||||
|
||||
# Create final JWT token
|
||||
token = JWTHandler.create_access_token(
|
||||
user_id=user.id,
|
||||
user_email=user.email,
|
||||
user_type=user.user_type,
|
||||
current_tenant=current_tenant_context,
|
||||
available_tenants=available_tenants,
|
||||
capabilities=user.capabilities or []
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create audit log for successful verification
|
||||
audit_log = AuditLog.create_log(
|
||||
action="user.tfa_verification_success",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
|
||||
details={"email": user.email},
|
||||
ip_address=request.client.host if request.client else None,
|
||||
user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent")
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.add(audit_log)
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info("TFA verification successful", user_id=user_id, email=user.email)
|
||||
|
||||
# Return response with user object for frontend validation
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
|
||||
response = JSONResponse(content={
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"access_token": token,
|
||||
"user": {
|
||||
"id": user.id,
|
||||
"email": user.email,
|
||||
"full_name": user.full_name,
|
||||
"user_type": user.user_type,
|
||||
"tenant_id": user.tenant_id,
|
||||
"capabilities": user.capabilities or [],
|
||||
"tfa_setup_pending": False
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Delete TFA session cookie
|
||||
response.delete_cookie(key="tfa_session")
|
||||
|
||||
return response
|
||||
|
||||
except HTTPException:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
logger.error("TFA verify login error", error=str(e))
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
|
||||
detail="Failed to verify TFA code"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/status", response_model=TFAStatusResponse)
|
||||
async def get_tfa_status(
|
||||
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user)
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Get TFA status for current user"""
|
||||
return TFAStatusResponse(
|
||||
tfa_enabled=current_user.tfa_enabled,
|
||||
tfa_required=current_user.tfa_required,
|
||||
tfa_status=current_user.tfa_status
|
||||
)
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user