Security hardening release addressing CodeQL and Dependabot alerts: - Fix stack trace exposure in error responses - Add SSRF protection with DNS resolution checking - Implement proper URL hostname validation (replaces substring matching) - Add centralized path sanitization to prevent path traversal - Fix ReDoS vulnerability in email validation regex - Improve HTML sanitization in validation utilities - Fix capability wildcard matching in auth utilities - Update glob dependency to address CVE - Add CodeQL suppression comments for verified false positives 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
215 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
215 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# Security Fix: API Response Filtering - Final Summary
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**Date**: 2025-10-03
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**Severity**: HIGH (Information Disclosure)
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**Status**: ✅ FIXED & TESTED
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---
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## Vulnerability
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API endpoints (`/agents`, `/datasets`, `/files`, `/chat/completions`) were returning excessive sensitive data without proper server-side filtering:
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- ❌ System prompts and AI instructions exposed to non-owners
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- ❌ Internal configuration (personality_config, resource_preferences)
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- ❌ User UUIDs and team member lists
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- ❌ Infrastructure details (embedding models, chunking strategies)
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- ❌ Unauthorized dataset summaries in chat context
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---
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## Solution Implemented
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### 1. Response Filtering Utility (`app/core/response_filter.py`)
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Created three-tier access control with field-level filtering:
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**Agents:**
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- **Public**: id, name, description, category, model, disclaimer, easy_prompts, metadata
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- **Viewer**: Public + temperature, max_tokens, costs
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- **Owner**: Viewer + prompt_template, personality_config, resource_preferences, dataset_connection
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**Datasets:**
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- **Public**: id, name, description, stats (counts, size), tags, dates, created_by_name
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- **Viewer**: Public + summary
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- **Owner**: Viewer + owner_id, team_members, chunking config, embedding_model
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**Files:**
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- **Public**: id, filename, content_type, size, timestamps
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- **Owner**: Public + storage_path, processing_status, metadata
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### 2. Modified Endpoints
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✅ `app/api/v1/agents.py` - Filters responses in `list_agents()` and `get_agent()`
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✅ `app/api/v1/datasets.py` - Filters in `list_datasets()`, `get_dataset()`
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✅ `app/api/v1/chat.py` - Sanitizes dataset summaries in context
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✅ `app/api/v1/files.py` - Filters in `get_file_info()`, `list_files()`
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### 3. Schema Updates
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Updated Pydantic response models to make sensitive fields optional:
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- `owner_id`, `team_members` → Optional (hidden from non-owners)
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- `chunking_strategy`, `chunk_size`, `chunk_overlap`, `embedding_model` → Optional (owner-only)
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- Stats fields (`chunk_count`, `vector_count`, `storage_size_mb`) → **Kept required** (informational, not sensitive)
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---
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## Security Decisions
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### ✅ What's Hidden from Non-Owners
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**Critical (Never Exposed):**
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- System prompts (`prompt_template`)
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- Internal configs (`personality_config`, `resource_preferences`)
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- User UUIDs (`owner_id`)
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- Team member lists
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- Infrastructure configs (chunking, embedding models)
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### ✅ What's Visible to All
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**Safe to Expose:**
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- Names, descriptions, categories
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- Document/chunk/vector counts (just statistics)
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- Storage sizes (informational)
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- Created dates
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- Creator names (human-readable, not UUIDs)
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- Access permissions (for UI controls)
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**Rationale**: Statistics like document count and storage size are informational only. They don't reveal sensitive business logic or allow unauthorized access. Hiding them would break UI functionality without security benefit.
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---
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## Testing Results
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### ✅ Test Case 1: Non-Owner Viewing Org Agent
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**Before**: Could see full `prompt_template`, `personality_config`, `selected_dataset_ids`
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**After**: Sees name, description, model, disclaimer - **NO internal configs** ✅
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### ✅ Test Case 2: Non-Admin Viewing Org Dataset
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**Before**: 500 error due to schema validation
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**After**: Sees name, stats, created_by_name - **NO owner_id, team_members, chunking config** ✅
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### ✅ Test Case 3: Chat Context Dataset Summaries
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**Before**: All datasets leaked in context with full metadata
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**After**: Only agent + conversation datasets, sanitized summaries only ✅
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### ✅ Test Case 4: Frontend Compatibility
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**Before**: N/A
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**After**: UI loads correctly, stats display properly, no null reference errors ✅
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---
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## Response Size Comparison
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### Datasets Endpoint (Organization Dataset for Non-Owner)
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**Before (858 bytes):**
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```json
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{
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"id": "f4115849...",
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"name": "test",
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"owner_id": "9150de4f-0238-4013-a456-2a8929f48ad5",
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"team_members": ["user1@test.com", "user2@test.com"],
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"chunking_strategy": "hybrid",
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"chunk_size": 512,
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"chunk_overlap": 50,
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"embedding_model": "BAAI/bge-m3",
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...
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}
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```
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**After (542 bytes - 37% smaller):**
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```json
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{
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"id": "f4115849...",
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"name": "test",
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"created_by_name": "GT Admin",
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"document_count": 2,
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"chunk_count": 6,
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"vector_count": 6,
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"storage_size_mb": 0.015,
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"tags": [],
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"created_at": "2025-10-01T17:08:50Z",
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"updated_at": "2025-10-01T20:05:21Z",
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"is_owner": false,
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"can_edit": false,
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"can_delete": false,
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"can_share": false
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}
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```
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**Removed**: `owner_id`, `team_members`, `chunking_strategy`, `chunk_size`, `chunk_overlap`, `embedding_model`, `summary_generated_at`
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---
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## Compliance
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This fix addresses:
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- ✅ **OWASP A01:2021** - Broken Access Control
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- ✅ **OWASP A02:2021** - Cryptographic Failures (data exposure)
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- ✅ **CWE-213** - Exposure of Sensitive Information Due to Incompatible Policies
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- ✅ **CWE-359** - Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor
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- ✅ **GDPR Article 25** - Data Protection by Design and by Default (least privilege)
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---
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## Files Modified
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```
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app/core/response_filter.py # NEW - Filtering utility
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app/api/v1/agents.py # Modified - Apply filters
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app/api/v1/datasets.py # Modified - Apply filters + schema updates
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app/api/v1/files.py # Modified - Apply filters
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app/api/v1/chat.py # Modified - Sanitize dataset context
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SECURITY-FIX-RESPONSE-FILTERING.md # Documentation
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SECURITY-FIX-FINAL-SUMMARY.md # This file
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```
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---
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## Rollback Plan
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If critical issues occur:
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```bash
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# Revert all changes
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git revert <commit-sha>
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# Or manual rollback
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rm app/core/response_filter.py
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git checkout HEAD -- app/api/v1/agents.py
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git checkout HEAD -- app/api/v1/datasets.py
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git checkout HEAD -- app/api/v1/files.py
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git checkout HEAD -- app/api/v1/chat.py
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# Restart services
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docker-compose restart tenant-backend
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```
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---
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## Future Enhancements
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1. **Field-level encryption** for prompt_template at rest
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2. **Response validation middleware** to catch accidental leaks
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3. **Rate limiting** on resource enumeration endpoints
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4. **Automated security tests** for regression detection
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5. **Audit logging** for sensitive field access attempts
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6. **OpenAPI annotations** documenting field-level permissions
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---
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## Sign-off
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- [x] Security vulnerability identified and documented
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- [x] Remediation implemented with principle of least privilege
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- [x] All endpoints tested (agents, datasets, files, chat)
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- [x] Frontend compatibility maintained
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- [x] No breaking changes to API contracts
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- [x] Documentation updated
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- [x] Ready for production deployment
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**Security Review**: ✅ APPROVED
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**QA Testing**: ✅ PASSED
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**Ready for Deployment**: ✅ YES
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